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Using panel data for Peru for the period 1994-2000, we find that when households 
receive two or more services jointly, the welfare increases of the household, as measured 
by changes in consumption, are larger than when services are provided separately. Such 
an increase appears to be more than proportional, as F-tests on the coefficients of the 
corresponding regressors confirm. Thus, we find that bundling of services may help 
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  41. Introduction 
 
A crucial policy question in developing countries is whether to provide basic social services 
individually or through an integrated approach in a bundled fashion. Today, most development 
agencies and Governments finance service provision through large sector programs, providing 
services to the beneficiary population on an individual basis, i.e., through separate water supply, 
electricity, or telecommunications projects.  Such sector programs typically have little 
coordination between them.  Similarly, even social or infrastructure fund projects that offer a 
menu of different services to the beneficiary population typically finance only one type of 
service for participating communities.  Most of these fund projects follow a menu approach, with 
local populations choosing the type of service they consider most important for their 
development.  But in most such projects, the beneficiary community will be excluded from 
renewed funding, at least until other, comparable communities have also benefited in a similar 
fashion. 
Such singular provision of services could imply that two potential gains of bundling 
service provision are foregone:  first, important savings could materialize due to economies of 
scale in the supply of bundled service delivery due to lower per unit connection costs of 
households.  Second, and the subject of this study, bundling could also lead to higher household 
welfare improvements if the joint provision of services yields higher returns for the household 
than if services were provided individually.  For example, clean water access could improve 
households’ well-being somewhat but might do so substantially only if it were to come together 
with sanitation.  Health risks might decline with water access only, but the real benefits might 
only materialize if the services are provided together.   
Empirical evidence on the impact of bundling public services on the welfare of the 
beneficiary population in developing countries is rare, largely due to lack of adequate data.  We 
overcome this problem by using recent national household surveys and constructing a three-
period panel for Peru. This country is one of a few that have panel availability for household 
surveys during a relatively extended period (1994-2000).  Furthermore, the availability of panel 
data coincides with a period of relative stability (Saavedra and Chong, 1999), which can help 
identify service delivery welfare effects.  The availability of household panel information for 
Peru has allowed some researchers to study dynamic patterns of consumption and income in the 
  5country.  Glewwe and Hall (1998) use limited panel data between 1986 and 1990 to study the 
decline in welfare of the most vulnerable during a macroeconomic shock.
1  Saavedra and Chong 
(1999) use a panel between 1991 and 1994 to study the patterns of the formal versus the informal 
sector in the country. 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
 
We use three national-level household surveys for the years 1994, 1997 and 2000 and construct 
panels for the corresponding periods: (i) 1994-1997; (ii) 1997-2000; and (iii) 1994-2000. As a 
way of testing for robustness in our findings, we also look at three different increasingly 
restrictive panel sub-samples in each case. First, we focus on households that have the very same 
head of household during all of the periods considered (World Bank, 1999).  Since the household 
head is typically the breadwinner in a developing country family, a change in the head can 
change the pattern of consumption radically.  Second, we also focus on all households that did 
not change size during the corresponding period of study. This is based on the premise that 
changes in household size will affect the consumption pattern of the household (Lanjouw and 
Ravaillon, 1995). Third, we focus on those households that both have the same head of 
household and the same household size during the corresponding period of the panel employed. 
This last comes as close as possible to a controlled experiment.  In particular, the reduced form 
empirically estimated follows: 
 
Log (Ch(x+ t) / Ch(x)) = α +  ϕ ln (Ch(x) ) + β Sh(x) + χ Ph(x) + µh(x)                      (1) 
 
where the term in the left hand side is the rate of change in consumption per-capita between the 
period x and the period (x + t) for a specific household h.
2   Also, S represents the variables that 
refer to characteristics of the household at the beginning of the measurement period.  They 
include the years of education of the head of the household, the age and gender of the head, 
mother tongue of the head, the number of members in the household, and whether the household 
belongs to a rural or urban area. P includes our set of variables of interest, that is, access to basic 
services, in particular, (i) water, (ii) sewerage, (iii) electricity, and (iv) telephones, again at the 
                                                           
1 The 1986 panel is not representative at the national level, and only so for Lima, the capital. 
2 Ch(x) is the consumption level at the initial period  x, and Ch(x+ t) is the consumption level at the end of the period, (x 
+ t). 
  6beginning of the measurement period.  While this simple approach is relatively standard 
(Bisogno and Chong, 2001; Glewwe and Hall, 2000), the key advantage is that it helps minimize 
endogeneity problems as we only include exogenous variables as initial conditions at the 
beginning of the measurement period. 
 
3.  Results and Robustness 
 
The findings of our analysis are presented in Table 1. Households that receive more than one 
service at the same time enjoy higher welfare, as measured by per capita expenditures, compared 
to those households that do not.  Having access to one public service only, regardless of which 
service that is, does not yield a statistically significant increase in welfare in any of our three 
panel regressions in Table 1. However, having access to two or more services together, 
regardless of which combination of services this is, does yield higher welfare and appears to be 
proportionally higher than when the effect is measured separately.  Indeed, we find important 
evidence of increasing returns to the number of services households command.  This is shown in 
the size of the corresponding coefficients for one, two, and more services, and in the fact that 
resulting coefficients due to marginal service addition tend to be statistically significant as 
shown in the lower panel of Table 1. In fact, the marginal impact of adding one public service to 
the welfare of the household tends to be statistically significant at conventional levels in two out 
of the three panels considered, as corresponding F-tests show. 
The above results are robust to changes in specification and, in particular, to potential 
variations due to changes in head and size of households. Both are critical to the dynamic 
consumption pattern of households (Lanjouw and Ravaillon, 1995).  Table 2 shows robustness 
regressions restricted to households that changed neither heads nor size between 1994 and 2000.   
We find that, regardless of the sub-sample employed, households that have access to more than 
one basic service are typically better off than those households that do not have such access. This 
is particularly clear in the case of households receiving three or more services, in the 1994-1997 
panel, and to a large extent, in the 1997-2000 panel, too. Increasing returns appear to be present 
in most of these cases as well. F-tests on the coefficients of services provide support on the 
latter, particularly in the case of three services or more.  
  7On the other hand, these findings can only be corroborated in the “same head” case using 
the 1994-2000 panel. Lack of data is likely the culprit, as the number of observations drops from 
601 in the full sample, to 123 (same size) and 109 (same size and head).  Lack of sufficient 
information in the different panel datasets also appears to be the reason why we obtain no 
systematic pattern when testing the sequence of specific service combinations (say, water and 
electricity, water and telephone, electricity and telephone, and so on).
3   
 
4. Conclusions   
 
In this paper we find important evidence that bundling of infrastructure services matters for 
households. When households receive two or more services jointly, the welfare increases are 
larger than when services are provided separately. The additional positive impact of each new 
basic service increases with the total number of services available. Such an increase appears to 
be more than proportional, as F-tests on the coefficients of the corresponding regressors confirm. 
Therefore, the joint provision of services helps realize welfare effects. This logic appears to be 
valid, at least, for the four services considered in this study, namely, sanitation, electricity, water, 
and telephone services.  Lack of data power does not allow us to examine the most beneficial 
sequence of service provision, which would constitute an important area for further research. 
 
 
                                                           
3 The above results are not due to a composition effect of service returns.  If all services show constant returns but 
households gain access to services in a particular order, then increasing returns could simply be the result of 
(typically) earlier provided services having lower returns than (typically) later provided services.  However, we find 
no statistically significant difference in estimated service parameters when we include (i) all four services 
separately, or (ii) all possible combinations of two services.  Also, municipality-level fixed effects are also tested. 
Results do not change although, in some cases regressions do not hold up as the number of observations becomes 
too small. This is particularly true in the robustness regressions. Results may be provided upon request. 
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Log of Per-Capita Consumption Ch(x) -0.698 -0.540 -0.559
(0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.042)***
Yerars of Education of Head of Household 0.028 0.028 0.025
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)***
Mother Tongue of Head of Household 0.120 0.117 0.023
(0.034)*** (0.030)*** (0.049)
Age of Head of Househould 0.006 0.006 0.009
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Gender of Head of Household (Male = 1) -0.116 -0.003 -0.010
(0.041)*** (0.034) (0.060)
Number of Members in Household -0.037 -0.034 -0.023
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)**
Head of Household was Born in Current Area -0.047 -0.024 0.000
(0.031) (0.024) (0.044)
Percentage of Members of Household that Work 0.069 0.099 -0.078
(0.071) (0.056)* (0.108)
Urban 0.054 -0.016 0.159
(0.049) (0.038) (0.071)**
Household Receives One Service 0.055 0.031 0.139
(0.052) (0.039) (0.073)*
Household Receives Two Services 0.161 0.157 0.186
(0.056)*** (0.044)*** (0.180)**
Household Received Three Services 0.300 0.287 0.272
(0.064)*** (0.050)*** (0.092)***
Household Receives Four Services 0.434 0.488 0.430
(0.081)*** (0.063)*** (0.119)***
Constant 5.193 3.580 3.744
(0.231)*** (0.226)*** (0.340)***
Observations 874 1767 601
R-Squared 0.44 0.20 0.28
Test of Coefficients of Services      
Two Services
   F-Test 0.434 2.267 2.966
   Probability 0.510 0.132 0.085*
Three Services
   F-Test 1.163 3.926 3.175
   Probability 0.281 0.047** 0.073*
Four Services
   F-Test 1.681 6.693 3.937
   Probability 0.195 0.01*** 0.041**
  
The dependent variable is the change in per-capita consumption at the household level. Standard errors in 
parentheses; *statistically significant at 10 percent; **statistically significant at 5e percent; ***statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Public services included are (i) piped water connection to the home for 13 hours per day or 
more; (ii) access to electricity; (iii) access to telephone line at home; and (iv) access to sewerage services at home. 
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Log of Per-Capita ConsumptionCh(x) -0.689 -0.610 -0.592 -0.536 -0.501 -0.506 -0.550 -0.493 -0.544
(0.030)*** (0.040)*** (0.041)*** (0.029)*** (0.040)*** (0.041)*** (0.044)*** (0.088)*** (0.095)***
Yerars of Education of Head of Household 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.035 0.043
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Mother Tongue of Head of Household 0.111 0.094 0.105 0.124 0.090 0.080 0.010 0.090 -0.029
(0.035)*** (0.048)** (0.050)** (0.031)*** (0.042)** (0.043)* (0.053) (0.118) (0.126)
Age of Head of Househould 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.006
(0.001)*** (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004) (0.004)
Gender of Head of Household (Male = 1) -0.145 -0.060 -0.070 0.006 0.044 0.043 0.048 0.049 0.071
(0.043)*** (0.056) (0.059) (0.035) (0.048) (0.049) (0.066) (0.114) (0.119)
Number of Members in Household -0.035 -0.077 -0.079 -0.035 -0.073 -0.072 -0.021 -0.062 -0.064
(0.008)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)* (0.031)** (0.033)*
Head of Household was Born in Current Area -0.028 -0.061 -0.048 -0.028 -0.050 -0.050 -0.019 -0.049 -0.042
(0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.104) (0.110)
Percentage of Members of Household that Work 0.077 0.175 0.172 0.098 -0.023 -0.022 -0.068 -0.177 -0.198
(0.074) (0.099)* (0.101)* (0.057)* (0.074) (0.075) (0.112) (0.209) (0.215)
Urban 0.078 0.094 0.076 -0.019 -0.015 -0.011 0.181 0.156 0.238
(0.051) (0.063) (0.064) (0.038) (0.050) (0.051) (0.076)** (0.140) (0.148)
Household Receives One Service 0.035 0.008 0.004 0.015 -0.046 -0.051 0.118 0.116 0.106
(0.054) (0.070) (0.072) (0.039) (0.053) (0.054) (0.078) (0.153) (0.159)
Household Receives Two Services 0.144 0.133 0.146 0.148 0.087 0.076 0.018 0.167 0.003
(0.057)** (0.076)* (0.078)* (0.045)*** (0.063) (0.063) (0.084) (0.162) (0.176)
Household Received Three Services 0.286 0.162 0.164 0.284 0.221 0.224 0.246 0.293 0.209
(0.066)*** (0.085)* (0.087)* (0.051)*** (0.070)*** (0.070)*** (0.097)** (0.188) (0.199)
Household Receives Four Services 0.431 0.308 0.294 0.478 0.349 0.338 0.402 0.372 0.220
(0.082)*** (0.109)*** (0.111)*** (0.064)*** (0.087)*** (0.088)*** (0.125)*** (0.233) (0.248)
Constant 5.136 4.824 4.691 3.572 3.676 3.717 3.609 3.547 3.945
(0.242)*** (0.330)*** (0.346)*** (0.230)*** (0.326)*** (0.330)*** (0.355)*** (0.750)*** (0.791)***
Observations 777 381 349 1690 799 786 518 123 109
R-Squared 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.31
 
The dependent variable is the change in per-capita consumption at the household level. Standard errors in parentheses; *statistically significant at ten percent; **statistically significant 
at five percent; ***statistically significant at one percent. Public services included are (i) piped water connection to the home for thirteen hours per day or more; (ii) access to electricity; 
(iii) access to telephone line at home; and  (iv) access to sewerage services at home. 
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